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Nicaragua-El Salvador: Potosi Probable Waterborne Infiltration Point

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Imagery Analysis Report

NGA Review Complete

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Nicaragua-El Salvador: Potosi Probable Waterborne	
Infiltration Point	25X1
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Summary	
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The facility, which is located on the	25X1
northern edge of Potosi, was originally a commercial transship-	23/1
ment area. We believe it began to function as an infiltration	
point for men and materiel to El Salvador in 1981 and has been used for that purpose since then.	25 X 1
used for that purpose since then.	25X1
The facility at Potosi consists of a large, lighted, wooden pier	•
two POL tanks; a warehouse; and two nearby groups of buildings	,
where men and supplies could be housed. It is guarded by a mili	
tary outpost located just outside its main entrance. The infil-	
tration of men and supplies to El Salvador appears to be carried out primarily with large canoes that cross either the Gulf of	•
Fonseca or the open sea to the Salvadoran coast.	25X1
However, canoes and other small craft,	25X1
ideally suited for waterborne infiltration operations, have been	1
observed at the facility. In addition, on several occasions	25X1
Nicaraguan patrol boats have been observed in the Potosi area	20/(1
under circumstances that suggest they were supporting infiltra- tion operations.	
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
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			25X ²
	Introduction		
	Infiltration of men, arms, and munitions from Nicaraguinsurgents in El Salvador continues to be a subject of concern for the Intelligence Community.	serious	25X1 ₁ 25X1 ¹
		•	
	This report discusses		25X′ 25X1X′
	a facility at Potosi in northwest Nicaragua is being used as an infiltration point to the gents in El Salvador.	tern	25X′ 25X′
	Discussion		
	Potosi is a small village located on the Gulf of Fonse northwest Nicaraqua, about 50 kilometers from El Salval). the Potosi area is being used to infiltrate men and suthe Salvadoran insurgents.	dor (figure	25X ² 25X1
	THE Salvadoran Histildenes.		5X1
	measuring 6 meters by 86 meters; a 25-meter by 40-meter house; two 28,000-liter horizontal POL tanks; a group	er ware- of 10	25X1
	buildings located west of the warehouse; and another of three buildings located east of the warehouse entire facility is fenced and there is a gate or barrithe road leading into it. A guard post is located just	The across	25X1
	the gate/barricade and two foxholes are located beside	e it	25X1
	A military outpost the only one identified in Polocated just outside the entrance. This outpost has	several	25 X 1
	small buildings and is ringed with defensive trenching		25 X ′
	The Potosi facility originally functioned as a terminal Potosi-La Union, El Salvador ferry. at least 13 semitral limits and least 13 semitral limits and pier services.	ailers and d near the	25X1 25X1 25X1
	shipment activity had ceased. We believe that in 1981 ity began to function as an infiltration point for sumen destined for the guerrillas in El Salvador and has	the facil- pplies and	25 X 1
	for that purpose since then.		25X1


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Figure 1

Location of Potosi, Nicaragua



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The location of the military outpost suggests that its primary function is to guard the facility. It is positioned just outside the main entrance to the facility—a location with no tactical advantage for defending the town of Potosi, other installations, or road intersections. The outpost was enlarged and its defenses were expanded significantly between early 1981, shortly after the facility had ceased to function as a commercial transshipment area, and December 1982, when we believe it was actively engaged in infiltrating men and materiel to El Salvador.	25X 1
Although on a few occasions Nicaraguan patrol boats have been observed anchored several hundred meters offshore of Potosi village, the primary activity at the infiltration facility is the presence of canoes/small boats along the shoreline. These small craft are ideally suited for waterborne infiltration operations. Since 1981, we have frequently seen between one and five canoes/small boats along the beach from 20 to 100 meters north and south of the pier but still within the confines of the facility. They have never been tied up at the pier.	25 X ′
Other than the presence of the canoes/small boats, which are often partially hidden under the trees along the shore, it appears that great care has been taken to conceal activity at the facilitysuggesting the facility has a covert function.	
troop formations, or other groups of people have been observed within the compound over the nearly three-year period. Nor have any vessels other than canoes/small boats been seen near the pier. This apparent lack of activity within the compound is not compatible with a facility having either a commercial/industrial function or an overt military function such as a patrol boat or military logistics facility.	X1 25X1
the main entrance gate, awaiting entrance into the facility. 25	5X1 X1 25X1

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deliv	and supplies intended for El Salvador would most likely be ered overland to Potosi by road from Managua through Leon Chinandega (figure 1). An alternate method would be by sea,	
in wh ferre vador	ich case men and supplies would arrive at Potosi, be trans- ed to canoes/small boats, and be infiltrated into El Sal- . Few vessels larger than canoes have been observed in the	, ,
seen and a cilit May 1	i area. However, on three occasions a Dabur patrol boat was anchored several hundred meters offshore of Potosi village bout 800 meters southeast of the probable infiltration favor. Two of the sightings were on consecutive days in early 983 when an unidentified boat, slightly more than half as	
long	as the Dabur, was anchored immediately astern of the patrol	
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A Dabur patrol boat was sighted for the third time The boat was anchored several hundred meters offshore with a large tarp draped across the aft deck and a large canoe moored alongside The combination of the patrol boat, the canoe, and the tarp at this location indicates that there was an arms transfer in progress, with the tarp being used to conceal oprotect the materials onboard the patrol boat: While the three patrol boat sightings suggest that infiltration activities were under way in the Potosi area, we cannot specifically link the patrol boats' activities with the Potosi probable infiltration facility. Canoes probably cross either the Gulf of Fonseca or the open sea to the Salvadoran coast at night. If the wooden canoes remain close to the Nicaraguan coast until they are west of Punta San Jose they probably would not be detected by Honduran or Salvadoran surveillance. Once the canoes begin crossing the Gulf of Fonseca near its mouth or farther west through the open sea, they are difficult to detect at night because of the large waves.		Secret
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References	
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